



## Conditional Importance Networks: A Graphical Language for Representing Ordinal, Monotonic Preferences over Sets of Goods

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
**Jérôme Lang**  
Université Paris Dauphine

International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 16, 2009



# Preferences on combinatorial domains...

- Preferences on a set of alternatives  $\Leftrightarrow$  defining a (reflexive) **binary relation**.
- Combinatorial set of alternatives  $(\mathcal{D}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{D}_n)$ :
  - explicit representation: exponential size ;
  - $\Rightarrow$  **compact representation language**.




# Combinatorial domains

Configuration, voting, planning, **resource allocation** ...

A special case: **Boolean combinatorial domains**.

- Domains of values isomorphic to  $\mathbb{B} = \{0, 1\}$ .
- Well-suited for representing preferences on **bundles of objects**.
- **Example:**  $\{o_1, o_2\} \succ \{o_3\}$ ,  $\{o_3, o_4\} \succ \{o_3\}$ .
- Preferences are very often (strictly) **monotonic**:  $X \subseteq Y \Rightarrow X \prec Y$ .



# Outline of the talk

## 1 From (T)CP-nets to CI-nets

CP-nets

TCP-nets


## 2 Conditional Importance Networks

CI-nets: language and semantics

Expressivity

Computational issues


CI-nets and resource allocation



## CP-nets [Boutilier et al., 2004]

### Example


$x, y : z_1 \succ z_2 \rightarrow$  "All other things being equal, if  $X = x$  and  $Y = y$ , then I prefer having  $Z = z_1$  than  $Z = z_2$ ".



**Boutilier, C., Brafman, R. I., Domshlak, C., Hoos, H. H., and Poole, D. (2004).**

CP-nets: A tool for representing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements.


*Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 21:135–191.



## CP-nets [Boutilier et al., 2004]

### Example

$x, y : z_1 \succ z_2 \rightarrow$  "All other things being equal, if  $X = x$  and  $Y = y$ , then I prefer having  $Z = z_1$  than  $Z = z_2$ ".



- CP-nets:  $a : b \triangleright \bar{b}$ ;
- whereas we want:  $a : b \triangleright c$ .



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## TCP-nets [Brafman et al., 2006]


- CP-nets enriched with (conditional) importance statements.
- TCP-nets:  $a : b \triangleright c$



**Brafman, R. I., Domshlak, C., and Shimony, S. E. (2006).**

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## TCP-nets [Brafman et al., 2006]


- CP-nets enriched with (conditional) importance statements.
- TCP-nets:  $a : b \triangleright c$
- ...but we also want:  $a : bc \triangleright de$ .



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## CI-nets: the language

### Conditional importance statement

**Conditional importance statement:**  $\mathcal{S}^+, \mathcal{S}^- : \mathcal{S}_1 \triangleright \mathcal{S}_2$  (with  $\mathcal{S}^+, \mathcal{S}^-$ ,  $\mathcal{S}_1$  and  $\mathcal{S}_2$  pairwise-disjoint).

**Example:**  $\overline{ad} : b \triangleright ce$  implies for example  $ab \succ ace$ ,  $abfg \succ acefg$ , ...


### CI-net


A CI-net on  $\mathcal{V}$  is a set  $\mathcal{N}$  of conditional importance statements on  $\mathcal{V}$ .



# Semantics


A CI-net of 4 objects  $\{a, b, c, d\}$ :  $\{a : d \triangleright bc, \overline{ad} : b \triangleright c, d : c \triangleright b\}$






# Semantics

A CI-net of 4 objects  $\{a, b, c, d\}$ :  $\{a : d \triangleright bc, \overline{ad} : b \triangleright c, d : c \triangleright b\}$



Induced preference relation  $\succ_{\mathcal{N}}$ : the smallest preference **monotonic** relation compatible with **all** CI-statements.



## Worsening flips

### Worsening flip

$\mathcal{V}_1 \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{V}_2$  is called a **worsening flip** wrt.  $\mathcal{N}$  if:


- either  $\mathcal{V}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{V}_2$  (monotonicity flip);
- or they match a CI-statement in  $\mathcal{N}$  (CI-flip).

### Proposition (dominance)

We have  $A \succ_{\mathcal{N}} B$  if and only if there exists a sequence of worsening flips from  $A$  to  $B$  wrt.  $\mathcal{N}$ .

### Proposition (satisfiability)

A CI-net  $\mathcal{N}$  is satisfiable if and only if it does not possess any cycle of worsening flips.



## Expressivity

### Proposition


CI-nets can express all strict monotonic preference relations on  $2^V$ .

**Proof sketch:** for every  $(X, Y)$  such that  $X \succ Y$  and  $X \not\subseteq Y$ , add the CI-statement  $(X \cap Y, \overline{X \cup Y}) : X \setminus Y \triangleright Y \setminus X$ .

### Proposition

Full expressivity is lost as soon as:

- (i) we do not allow positive preconditions;
- (ii) we do not allow negative preconditions;
- (iii) the cardinality of compared sets is bounded by a fixed integer.




# Optimization

## [NON-DOMINATED]

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**Input:** A satisfiable CI-net  $\mathcal{N}$ , a bundle  $X$ .

**Question:** Is  $X$  non dominated for  $\succ_{\mathcal{N}}$  ?




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# Optimization

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
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More interesting:

- Constrained optimization
- Resource allocation




## Dominance

### [DOMINANCE]

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**Input:** A (satisfiable) CI-net  $\mathcal{N}$ , two bundles  $X$  and  $Y$ .

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# Dominance

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
**Question:**  $X \succ_{\mathcal{N}} Y$  ?

Some bad news...

## Proposition

[DOMINANCE] in satisfiable CI-nets is **PSPACE**-complete, even under any of these restrictions:

- 1 every CI-statement bears on singletons and has no negative preconditions;
- 2 every CI-statement bears on singletons and has no positive preconditions;
- 3 every CI-statement is precondition-free.



## Dominance

### [DOMINANCE]

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**Question:**  $X \succ_{\mathcal{N}} Y$  ?


Some good news...

**SCI-nets:** precondition-free, singleton-comparing CI-statements.

**Example:**  $\{a \triangleright c, b \triangleright c, e \triangleright d\}$ .

### Proposition

[DOMINANCE] in satisfiable SCI-nets is in P.




# Satisfiability

## [SATISFIABILITY]

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**Input:** A CI-net  $\mathcal{N}$ .

**Question:** Is  $\mathcal{N}$  satisfiable ?



# Satisfiability

[SATISFIABILITY]


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Some bad news...

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[SATISFIABILITY] for CI-nets is **PSPACE**-complete.



# Satisfiability


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
- [SATISFIABILITY] for SCI-nets is in P.
- Two **sufficient** conditions for satisfiability: based on **acyclicity**.



## CI-nets and resource allocation

CI-nets can be used to express fair division problems.


- **Objects:**  $\mathcal{V} = \{a, b, c\}$ .
- **Agents:**
  - $\mathcal{N}_1 = \{b : c \triangleright a, \bar{b} : a \triangleright c\}$  ;
  - $\mathcal{N}_2 = \{c \triangleright a, a \triangleright b\}$



## CI-nets and resource allocation


CI-nets can be used to express fair division problems.

- **Objects:**  $\mathcal{V} = \{a, b, c\}$ .
- **Agents:**
  - $\mathcal{N}_1 = \{b : c \triangleright a, \bar{b} : a \triangleright c\}$  ;
  - $\mathcal{N}_2 = \{c \triangleright a, a \triangleright b\}$
- $\langle 1 : a, 2 : bc \rangle$  is **not envy-free possible**.
- $\langle 1 : b, 2 : ac \rangle$  is **envy-free possible but not envy-free necessary**.



## Summary and future work


- a new ordinal language based on conditional importance and on the *Ceteris Paribus* assumption;
- some satisfiability conditions;
- some investigations about expressivity of this language;
- some complexity results about this language.





## Summary and future work

- a new ordinal language based on conditional importance and on the *Ceteris Paribus* assumption;
- some satisfiability conditions;
- some investigations about expressivity of this language;
- some complexity results about this language.



- **Future work:** We need to apply this to resource allocation and constrained optimization (some insights in the paper).