Sylvain Bouveret's web page

@InProceedings{LMBLBBMRM-SIGCSE22,
  author =	 {Anne-Laure Ligozat and Kevin Marquet and Aurélie Bugeau and Julien Lefevre and Pierre Boulet and Sylvain Bouveret and Philippe Marquet and Olivier Ridoux and Olivier Michel},
  title =	 {How to Integrate Environmental Challenges in Computing Curricula?},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 53rd ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education (SIGCSE'22)},
  year =	 2022,
  address =	 {Providence, RI, USA.},
  month =	 {March},
  publisher =	 {ACM},
  url =          {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/SIGCSE22.pdf},
  abstract =     {This paper advocates for the integration of environmental aspects in computing curricula, with a focus on higher education. We created knowledge-based curriculum specifications in order to help teachers who wish to add knowledge foundation on computing impacts. This document lists topics and references that can be integrated into curricula. We implemented it in several higher education institutions. This paper reports on our experience and feedback. We also discuss recommendations to overcome obstacles that, from our experience, are often faced when modifying computing curricula to integrate environmental challenges.}
}

@InProceedings{SBBM-ADT21,
  author =	 {Shams, Parham and Beynier, Aur\'elie and Bouveret, Sylvain and Maudet, Nicolas},
  title =	 {Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT'21)},
  year =	 2021,
  address =	 {Toulouse, France},
  month =	 {Nov},
  publisher =	 {Springer Verlag},
  url =          {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ADT21.pdf},
  abstract =     {In fair resource allocation, envy freeness (EF) is one of the most interesting fairness criteria as it ensures no agent prefers the bundle of another agent. However, when considering indivisible goods, an EF allocation may not exist. In this paper, we investigate a new relaxation of EF consisting in minimizing the Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) of the envy vector. The idea is to choose the allocation that is fair in the sense of the distribution of the envy among agents. The OWA aggregator is a well-known tool to express fairness in multiagent optimization. In this paper, we focus on fair OWA operators where the weights of the OWA are decreasing. When an EF allocation exists, minimizing OWA envy will return this allocation. However, when no EF allocation exists, one may wonder how fair min OWA envy allocations are. After defining the model, we show how to formulate the computation of such a min OWA envy allocation as a Mixed Integer Program. Then, we investigate the link between the min OWA allocation and other well-known fairness measures such as max min share and EF up to one good or to any good. Finally, we run some experiments comparing the performances of our approach with MNW (Max Nash Welfare) on several criteria such as the percentage of EF up to one good and any good.}
}

@InProceedings{MBP-AAMAS21,
  author =	 {Mittelmann, Munyque and Bouveret, Sylvain and Perrussel, Laurent},
  title =	 {A General Framework for the Logical Representation of Combinatorial Exchange Protocols},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on
                  Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS'21)},
  year =	 2021,
  address =	 {London, UK},
  month =	 {May},
  publisher =	 {IFAAMAS},
  pages =	 {3 pages},
  note =         {(short paper)},
  url =          {https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.02061},
  abstract =     {The goal of this paper is to propose a framework for representing and reasoning about the rules governing a combinatorial exchange. Such a framework is at first interest as long as we want to build up digital marketplaces based on auction, a widely used mechanism for automated transactions. Combinatorial exchange is the most general case of auctions, mixing the double and combinatorial variants: agents bid to trade bundles of goods. Hence the framework should fulfill two requirements: (i) it should enable bidders to express their bids on combinations of goods and (ii) it should allow describing the rules governing some market, namely the legal bids, the allocation and payment rules. To do so, we define a logical language in the spirit of the Game Description Language: the Combinatorial Exchange Description Language is the first language for describing combinatorial exchange in a logical framework. The contribution is two-fold: first, we illustrate the general dimension by representing different kinds of protocols, and second, we show how to reason about auction properties in this machine-processable language.}
}

@article{SBBM-JAIR22,
  author    = {Parham Shams and Aurélie Beynier and Sylvain Bouveret and Nicolas Maudet},
  title     = {Fair in the Eyes of Others},
  journal   = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)},
  volume    = {75},
  year      = {2022},
  pages     = {913-951},
  url       = {https://jair.org/index.php/jair/article/view/13778/26864},
  abstract  = {Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation, capturing some aspects of fairness.  The notion of envy being inherently subjective though, it might be the case that an agent envies another agent, but that from the other agents' point of view, she has no reason to do so. The difficulty here is to define the notion of objectivity, since no ground-truth can properly serve as a basis of this definition. A natural approach is to consider the judgement of the other agents as a proxy for objectivity. Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent $a_i$ experiences approval envy towards $a_j$ if she is envious of $a_j$, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives. Another thoroughly studied notion in resource allocation is proportionality. The same variant can be studied, opening natural questions regarding the links between these two notions. We exhibit several properties of these notions. Computing the minimal threshold guaranteeing approval envy and approval non-proportionality clearly inherits well-known intractable results from envy-freeness and proportionality, but (i) we identify some tractable cases such as house allocation; and (ii) we provide a general method based on a mixed integer programming encoding of the problem, which proves to be efficient in practice. This allows us in particular to show experimentally that existence of such allocations, with a rather small threshold, is very often observed.}
}

@InProceedings{BBLMRS-AAMAS19,
  author =	 {Beynier, Aur\'elie and Bouveret, Sylvain and
                  Lema{\^i}tre, Michel and Maudet, Nicolas and Rey,
                  Simon and Shams, Parham},
  title =	 {Efficiency, Sequenceability and Deal-Optimality in
                  Fair Division of Indivisible Goods},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on
                  Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS'19)},
  year =	 2019,
  address =	 {Montreal, Canada},
  month =	 {May},
  publisher =	 {IFAAMAS},
  pages =	 {9 pages},
  url =          {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/en/cycle-deals.php},
  abstract =     {In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. Another intuitive way to obtain an allocation is to give objects to agents in the first place, and to let agents exchange them as long as such ``deals'' are beneficial. This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other efficiency and fairness notions. In particular, we show that an allocation is sequenceable if and only if it is optimal for a certain type of deals, namely cycle deals involving a single object.  Furthermore, any Pareto-optimal allocation is sequenceable, but not the converse. Regarding fairness, we show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. To complete the picture, we show how some domain restrictions may affect the relations between these notions. Finally, we experimentally explore the links between the scales of efficiency and fairness.}
}

@InProceedings{ABLM-AAAI18,
  author =	 {Haris Aziz and Sylvain Bouveret and Ioannis Caragiannis and Ira Giagkousi and Jérôme Lang},
  title =	 {Knowledge, Fairness, and Social Constraints},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI conference on
                  Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'18)},
  year =	 2018,
  publisher =	 {AAAI Press},
  address =      {New Orleans, Louisiana, USA},
  url =          {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/AAAI18.pdf},
  abstract =     {In the context of fair allocation of indivisible items, fairness concepts often compare the satisfaction of an agent to the satisfaction she would have from items that are not allocated to her: in particular, envy-freeness requires that no agent prefers the share of someone else to her own share. We argue that these notions could also be defined relative to the knowledge that an agent has on how the items that she does not receive are distributed among other agents. We define a family of epistemic notions of envy-freeness, parameterized by a social graph, where an agent observes the share of her neighbours but not of her non-neighbours. We also define an intermediate notion between envy-freeness and proportionality, also parameterized by a social graph. These weaker notions of envy-freeness are useful when seeking a fair allocation, since envy-freeness is often too strong. We position these notions with respect to known ones, thus revealing new rich hierarchies of fairness concepts. Finally, we present a very general framework that covers all the existing and many new fairness concepts.}
}

@inproceedings{SBG-MOMM17,
  author =	 {Sales Fonteles, André and Sylvain Bouveret and Jérôme Gensel},
  title =	 {A programming framework for Spatial Crowdsourcing},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
                  Advances in Mobile Computing and Multimedia, MoMM
                  2017},
  address =	 {Salzbourg, Austria},
  month =	 {December},
  year =	 2017,
  abstract =     {Spatial crowdsourcing platforms (SCP) are systems that allow someone, or something, to publish spatial tasks in order to find suitable workforce to perform it. These tasks require people, often using mobile devices, to be at a given location in order to accomplish them. SCPs have been source of much interest for both academy and industry. For this reason, Doan argued in 2011 that the race was now on "toward building general crowdsourcing platforms that can be used to develop such systems quickly". Since then, not much has been done in this matter. More important, there is a gap between what is done in the industry and is proposed in the literature. We propose GENIUS-C, a framework to support the development of SCPs. This framework is based on a generic architecture previously proposed by Fonteles et al., 2016 and designed to bridge the gap between academy and industry. Among other things, GENIUS-C is meant to reduce time-to-market, development cost and effort and increase overall quality of SCPs. A case study SCP has been created using GENIUS-C in order to demonstrate its benefits and how it can be used in the developments of new SCPs.}
}

@InProceedings{BCDL-IJCAI17,
  author =	 {Sylvain Bouveret and Yann Chevaleyre and François
                  Durand and Jérôme Lang},
  title =	 {Voting by Sequential Elimination with few Voters},
  booktitle =    {Proceedings of the 26th International Joint
                  Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17)},
  year =	 2017,
  month =	 aug,
  url =		 {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/IJCAI17-sequences.pdf},
  address =	 {Melbourne, Australia},
  abstract =     {We define a new class of low-communication voting rules, tailored for contexts with few voters and possibly many candidates. These rules are defined by a predefined sequence of voters: at each stage, the designated voter eliminates a candidate, and the last remaining candidate wins. We study deterministic and randomized versions of these rules. We first investigate their axiomatic properties. Then we focus on a subfamily of rules defined by "non-interleaved" sequences, for which we seek a sequence that best approximates the Borda rule under Impartial Culture. Finally, we apply our rules to randomly generated data.}
}

@InProceedings{BCEIP-IJCAI17,
  author =	 {Sylvain Bouveret and Katarína Cechlárová and Edith Elkind and Ayumi Igarashi and Dominik Peters},
  title =	 {Fair Division of a Graph},
  booktitle =    {Proceedings of the 26th International Joint
                  Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17)},
  year =	 2017,
  month =	 aug,
  url =		 {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/IJCAI17-cakecutting.pdf},
  address =	 {Melbourne, Australia},
  abstract =     {We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework captures, e.g., fair allocation of land plots, where the graph describes the accessibility relation among the plots. We focus on agents that have additive utilities for the items, and consider several common fair division solution concepts, such as proportionality, envy-freeness and maximin share guarantee. While finding good allocations according to these solution concepts is computationally hard in general, we design efficient algorithms for special cases where the underlying graph has simple structure, and/or the number of agents -- or, less restrictively, the number of agent types -- is small. In particular, despite non-existence results in the general case, we prove that for acyclic graphs a maximin share allocation always exists and can be found efficiently.}
}

@InProceedings{ABLM-AAAI17,
  author =	 {Haris Aziz and Sylvain Bouveret and Jérôme Lang and
                  Simon Mackenzie},
  title =	 {Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 31st AAAI conference on
                  Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'17)},
  year =	 2017,
  publisher =	 {AAAI Press},
  address =      {San Francisco, California, USA},
  url =          {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/AAAI17.pdf},
  abstract =     {Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns in which they take one item among those that are still available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not strategyproof. This raises the question of the complexity of computing a preference report that yields a higher utility than the truthful preference. We show that the problem is NP-complete for one manipulating agent with additive utilities and several non-manipulating agents. In doing so, we correct a wrong claim made in a previous paper. We then give two additional results. First, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for optimal manipulation when the manipulator has additive binary utilities. Second, we consider a stronger notion of manipulation whereby the untruthful outcome yields more utility than the truthful outcome for all utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences; for this notion, we show that a manipulation, if any, can be computed in polynomial time.}
}

@inproceedings{SBG-MOMM15,
  author =	 {Sales Fonteles, André and Sylvain Bouveret and
                  Jérôme Gensel},
  editor =	 {Liming Luke Chen and Matthias Steinbauer and Ismail
                  Khalil and Gabriele Anderst{-}Kotsis},
  title =	 {Heuristics for Task Recommendation in Spatiotemporal
                  Crowdsourcing Systems},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
                  Advances in Mobile Computing and Multimedia, MoMM
                  2015},
  address =	 {Brussels, Belgium},
  month =	 {December},
  pages =	 {1--5},
  year =	 2015,
  abstract =     {Crowdsourcing systems (CS) are platforms that enable a system or a user to publish tasks in order to be accomplished by others. Typically, a CS is a system where users, called workers, perform tasks using desktop computers. Recently, some CS have appeared with spatiotemporal tasks. Such tasks require a worker to be in a given location within a specific time-window to be accomplished. We propose and study here the usage of five heuristics for solving the NP-hard trajectory recommendation problem (TRP). In a TRP, the system recommends a trajectory to a worker that allows him to accomplish spatiotemporal tasks he has skill and/or affinity with, without exceeding his available time. Our experiments show that some of our heuristics are efficient alternatives for a heavy optimal approach providing trajectories with an average utility of about 60\% of the optimal ones.}
}

@InProceedings{BL-ECAI14,
  author = 	 {Sylvain Bouveret and Jérôme Lang},
  title = 	 {Manipulating picking sequences},
  booktitle =    {Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'14)},
  year = 	 2014,
  month = 	 {August},
  address = 	 {Prague, Czech Republic},
  publisher =    {{IOS} Press},
  abstract =     {Picking sequences are a natural way of allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner: at each stage, a designated agent chooses an item among those that remain available. We address the computational issues of the manipulation of picking sequences by an agent or a coalition of agents. We show that a single agent can compute an optimal manipulation in polynomial time. Then we consider several notions of coalitional manipulation; for one of these notions, we show that computing an optimal manipulation is easy. We temper these results by giving a nontrivial upper bound on the impact of manipulation on the loss of social welfare.},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ECAI14.pdf},
  urlfull   = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ECAI14-full.pdf}
}

@InProceedings{BL-AAMAS14,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître},
  title     = {Characterizing Conflicts in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods Using a Scale of Criteria},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS'14)},
  year      = 2014,
  address   = {Paris, France},
  month     = {May},
  publisher = {ACM},
  abstract  = {We investigate five different fairness criteria in a simple model of fair resource allocation of indivisible goods based on additive
preferences. We show how these criteria are connected to each other, forming an ordered scale that can be used to characterize how conflicting the agents' preferences are: the less conflicting the preferences are, the more demanding criterion this instance will be able to satisfy, and the more satisfactory the allocation will be. We analyze the computational properties of the five criteria, give some experimental results about them, and further investigate a slightly richer model with $k$-additive preferences.},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/AAMAS14.pdf},
  urlfull   = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/AAMAS14-full.pdf},
  note      = {Runner up for best paper award}
}

@InProceedings{BBLNNR-ECAI14,
  author = 	 {Dorothea Baumeister and Sylvain Bouveret and Jérôme Lang and Nhan-Tam Nguyen and {Trung Thanh} Nguyen and Jörg Rothe},
  title = 	 {Scoring Rules for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods},
  booktitle =    {Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'14)},
  year = 	 2014,
  month = 	 {August},
  address = 	 {Prague, Czech Republic},
  publisher =    {{IOS} Press},
  abstract =     {We define a family of rules for dividing $m$ indivisible goods among agents, parameterized by a scoring vector and a social welfare aggregation function. We assume that agents' preferences over sets of goods are additive, but that the input is ordinal: each agent simply ranks single goods. Similarly to (positional) scoring rules in voting, a scoring vector $s = (s_1, \ldots , s_m)$ consists of $m$ nonincreasing nonnegative weights, where $s_i$ is the score of a good assigned to an agent who ranks it in position $i$. The global score of an allocation for an agent is the sum of the scores of the goods assigned to her. The social welfare of an allocation is the aggregation of the scores of all agents, for some aggregation function $\star$ such as, typically, $+$ or $\min$. The rule associated with $s$ and $\star$ maps a profile to (one of) the allocation(s) maximizing social welfare.  After defining this family of rules, and focusing on some key examples, we investigate some of the social-choice-theoretic properties of this family of rules, such as various kinds of monotonicity, separability, envy-freeness, and Pareto efficiency.},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ECAI14-2.pdf}
}

@InProceedings{LBL-ECAI12,
  author    = {Charles Lumet and Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître},
  title     = {Fair division of indivisible goods under risk},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'12)},
  year      = 2012,
  address   = {Montpellier, France},
  month     = {August},
  publisher = {{IOS} Press},
  abstract  = {We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ indivisible objects to $n$ agents having additive preferences over them. In this paper we propose an extension of this classical problem, where each object can possibly be in bad condition (\textit{e.g} broken), in which case its actual value is zero. We assume that the central authority in charge of allocating the objects does not know beforehand the objects conditions, but only has probabilistic information. The aim of this work is to propose a formal model of this problem, to adapt some classical fairness criteria to this extended setting, and to introduce several approaches to compute optimal allocations for small instances as well as suboptimal good allocations for real-world inspired allocation problems of realistic size.},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ECAI12.pdf}
}

@InProceedings{BL-IJCAI11,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and Jérôme Lang},
  title     = {A general elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible goods},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 22st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'11)},
  year      = 2011,
  address   = {Barcelona, Spain},
  month     = {July},
  abstract  = {We consider the following sequential allocation process. A benevolent central authority has to allocate a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents whose preferences it is totally ignorant of. We consider the process of allocating objects one after the other by designating an agent and asking her to pick one of the objects among those that remain. The problem consists in choosing the "best" sequence of agents, according to some optimality criterion. We assume that agents have additive preferences over objects. The choice of an optimality criterion depends on three parameters: how utilities of objects are related to their ranking in an agent's preference relation; how the preferences of different agents are correlated; and how social welfare is defined from the agents' utilities. We address the computation of a sequence maximizing expected social welfare under several assumptions. We also address strategical issues.},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/IJCAI11.pdf},
}

@InProceedings{BEL-ECAI10,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and Ulle Endriss and Jérôme Lang},
  title     = {Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'10)},
  year      = 2010,
  address   = {Lisbon, Portugal},
  month     = {August},
  publisher = {{IOS} Press},
  abstract  = {We study the problem of fairly dividing a set of goods amongst a group of agents, when those agents have preferences that are ordinal relations over alternative bundles of goods (rather than utility functions) and when our knowledge of those preferences is incomplete. The incompleteness of the preferences stems from the fact that each agent reports their preferences by means of an expression of bounded size in a compact preference representation language. Specifically, we assume that each agent only provides a ranking of individual goods (rather than of bundles). In this context, we consider the algorithmic problem of deciding whether there exists an allocation that is possibly (or necessarily) envy-free, given the incomplete preference information available, if in addition some mild economic efficiency criteria need to be satisfied. We provide simple characterisations, giving rise to simple algorithms, for some instances of the problem, and computational complexity results, establishing the intractability of the problem, for others. 
},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ECAI10.pdf}
}

@InProceedings{KBKZ-ADT09,
  author    = {Bart {de Keijzer} and Sylvain Bouveret and Tomas Klos and Yingqian Zhang},
  title     = {On the complexity of efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods with additive preferences},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT'09)},
  year      = 2009,
  series    = {Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence},
  address   = {Venice, Italy},
  month     = {October},
  publisher = {Springer Verlag},
  abstract  = {We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents having additive preferences. We introduce two new important complexity results concerning efficiency and fairness in resource allocation problems: we prove that the problem of deciding whether a given allocation is Pareto-optimal is \textsf{coNP}-complete, and that the problem of deciding whether there is a Pareto-efficient and envy-free allocation is $\Sigma_2^p$-complete.},
  url       = {http://recherche.noiraudes.net/resources/papers/ADT09.pdf}
}

@InProceedings{BEL-IJCAI09,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and Ulle Endriss and Jérôme Lang},
  title     = {Conditional Importance Networks: A Graphical Language for Representing Ordinal, Monotonic Preferences over Sets of Goods},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'09)},
  pages     = {67-72},
  year      = 2009,
  address   = {Pasadena, California, USA},
  month     = {July},
  abstract  = {While there are several languages for representing combinatorial preferences over sets of alternatives, none of these are well-suited to the representation of ordinal preferences over sets of goods (which are typically required to be monotonic). We propose such a language, taking inspiration from previous work on graphical languages for preference representation, specifically CP-nets, and introduce conditional importance networks (CI-nets). A CI-net includes statements of the form "if I have a set A of goods, and I do not have any of the goods from some other set B, then I prefer the set of goods C over the set of goods D." We investigate expressivity and complexity issues for CI-nets. Then we show that CI-nets are well-suited to the description of fair division problems.},
  url       = {http://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/09/Papers/022.pdf}
}

@inproceedings{BL-IJCAI07,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and
               Michel Lemaître},
  title     = {New Constraint Programming Approaches for the Computation
               of Leximin-Optimal Solutions in Constraint Networks},
  editor    = {Manuela M. Veloso},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'07)},
  year      = {2007},
  month     = {January},
  address   = {Hyderabad, India},
  pages     = {62-67},
  url       = {http://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/07/Papers/008.pdf},
  abstract  = {We study the problem of computing a leximin-optimal solution of a constraint network. This problem is highly motivated by fairness and efficiency requirements in many real-world applications implying human agents. We compare several generic algorithms which solve this problem in a constraint programming framework. The first one is entirely original, and the other ones are partially based on existing works adapted to fit with this problem.}
}

@inproceedings{BL-IJCAI05,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and
               Jérôme Lang},
  title     = {Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible
               goods: logical representation and complexity},
  pages     = {935-940},
  editor    = {Leslie Pack Kaelbling and
               Alessandro Saffiotti},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05)},
  address   = {Edinburgh, Scotland},
  month     = {July},
  publisher = {Professional Book Center},
  year      = {2005},
  url       = {http://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/05/Papers/0656.pdf},
  abstract = {We study fair division of indivisible goods among agents from the point of view of compact representation and computational complexity. We identify the complexity of several problems, including that of deciding whether there exists an efficient and envy-free allocation when preferences are represented in a succinct way. We also draw connections to nonmonotonic reasoning.}
}

@inproceedings{BLFL-AAMAS05,
  author    = {Sylvain Bouveret and
               Michel Lemaître and
               Hélène Fargier and
               Jérôme Lang},
  title     = {Allocation of indivisible goods: a general model and some
               complexity results},
  editor    = {Frank Dignum and
               Virginia Dignum and
               Sven Koenig and
               Sarit Kraus and
               Munindar P. Singh and
               Michael Wooldridge},
  booktitle = {4rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents
               and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'05)},
  address   = {Utrecht, The Netherlands},
  month     = {July},
  publisher = {ACM},
  year      = {2005},
  pages     = {1309-1310},
  url       = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1082473.1082747},
  note      = {(short paper)},
  abstract  = {Many industrial or research activities are so expensive that it is often benefitable for the involved agents to cofund the construction or the purchase of a common required resource. This resource will then be exploited in common, therefore in a shared way. The rules for resource sharing should take account of the possibly antagonistic preferences: each agent wants to maximize its own satisfaction, whereas, from the collective point of view, decisions which both are equitable and exploit the resources in an optimal way are looked for. We give in this article a formal model for indivisible goods resource sharing without monetary compensations and with arbitrary admissibility constraints. We also give some complexity results about this model. The model is applied to a real-world case, namely satellite resource sharing.}
}